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Our paper provides a theoretical explanation for the time-varying macroeconomic volatility by 
introducing the unobservability of regime switching and learning. With the unobservability of 
regime switching, agents must endogenously form their expectations using best-performed 
forecasting models. We find that if the regime switching is observable to agents, agents do not 
shift their expectation frequently and so will not generate a larger macroeconomic volatility. 
However, with the unobservability of regime switching where no agents can know which regime 
is dominant, allowing endogenous expectation formation would give rise to larger macro 
fluctuations (first-layer amplification mechanism), which is made through agents frequently 
shifting their expectations. Furthermore, we consider the policy implication under the zero lower 
bound. Our simulations show that in the unobservable regime switching, the economy is more 
likely to fall into a deflationary trap.  To avoid the deflation risk, the policy maker should set a 
higher expected inflation based threshold. If the expected inflation is under the threshold, an 
aggressive policy rate will be implemented; otherwise, the normal Taylor-rule monetary policy 
will be used. Furthermore, to reduce the deflation risk, the strategy for the policy maker is to raise 
the threshold, and this will generate larger macroeconomic fluctuations (second-layer 
amplification mechanism) due to more frequent policy strategy switching. We argue that 
sometimes only with unobservability, the policy maker faces a dilemma between avoiding 
deflation risk and maintaining macroeconomic stability, and huge macroeconomic fluctuations do 
not necessarily result from bad luck or bad policy but from the two-layer amplification mechanism 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Time-varying volatility has been an attractive topic in macroeconomics and financial markets in 
recent years. From the volatility evolution of aggregate macroeconomic variables in US economy 
in figure 1 and 2, two regularities can be clearly seen. First, the volatility of macroeconomic data 
including the real GDP growth and the GDP deflator is time-varying through the whole sample. 
Second, the absolute deviation of real GDP growth and GDP deflator before 1984 is much larger 
than that after 1984 (before 2008). For the first regularity, many scholars explored the question by 
using ad hoc setting. Some of them used GARCH approach or stochastic volatility approach to 
relax the setting of the time-invariant variance. Shephard (2008) argues that the stochastic 
volatility setting can surprisingly capture some important features of economic data. Justiniano 
and Primiceri (2006) and Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez (2007) introduce stochastic 
volatility approach in the DSGE framework and improve the model’s performance in data fitting. 
For the second regularity, many researchers modeled the scenario in time-varying and structural 
break setting and explored the interesting phenomenon. Kim and Nelson (1999) used Bayesian 
Markov-Switching model to find structural changes after 1980 and McConnell and Perez-Quiros 
(2000) explored the interesting phenomenon that the volatility of US output growth has shown a 
substantial decline in the early 1980s. Afterwards, Sensier and Dijk (2004) used 214 US 
macroeconomic time series over the period 1959-1999 to test for a change in the volatility. They 
find that after 1980 structural breaks occurred more than before 1980, which is supported by 80% 
of these series. However, all models use the ad hoc setting and improve the data fitting.  
Researchers usually model variances of shocks as constant throughout the whole sample, 
for example, smets and Wouters (2003, 2007), Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and An and 
Schorfheide (2007). However, in many areas such as asset pricing, monetary policy and term 
structures, scholars usually find the empirical regularity that the volatility of macroeconomic data 
is time-varying and often exogenously assume stochastic process for volatility and explore the 
effect of this setting. Their objective is to improve the performance in data fitting and the model 
forecasting. 
Unfortunately, those setups for the time-varying volatility were ad hoc and had no sound 
micro-foundation. Early important literature concentrates on empirical studies that tried to measure 
the time component in the variance of inflation, for example, Khan (1977) used the absolute value 
2 
 
of the first difference of inflation and Klein (1977) used a moving variance around a moving mean 
as a key measure.  
 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth, absolute deviation from one-year-rolling-window mean 
 
Figure 2. CPI-based inflation, absolute deviation from one-year-rolling-window mean 
The main breakthrough was made by Engle (1982) who proposed autoregressive 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































time series variables is modeled as autoregressive process. The advantage of ARCH is that people 
can easily deal with a scoring iterative maximum likelihood method and OLS method. Many 
studies also used the original idea to obtain the time-varying dynamic features of macroeconomic 
variables including that Engle (1982) found the British inflation has time-varying behaviors. After 
Engle (1982), there are 139 variations of Engle (1982), see Bollerslev (2010). For example, 
Generalized ARCH (GARCH) was created by Bollerslev (1986), Nonlinear GARCH was 
proposed by Engle and Ng (1993).  Nelson (1991) put forward Exponential GARCGH, ZakoÔan 
(1994) came up with threshold GARCH and Sentana (1995) raised Quadratic GARCH, and so on.
 Many studies also use the stochastic volatility approach to discuss the macroeconomic 
volatility. The first literature that stochastic volatility approach was introduced in the DSGE 
framework is Justiniano and Primiceri (2006) and then Fernandez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramirez 
(2007), which relax the assumption of time-invariant-variance shocks. The introduction of 
stochastic volatility into DSGE models shows the volatility of shocks has been changed 
significantly over time and improve the model’s performance. Shephard (2008) argues that the 
stochastic volatility setting can surprisingly capture some important features of economic data. 
However, those papers only set the volatility of shocks exogenously. There are some debates about 
advantages and disadvantages of the stochastic volatility approach and the GARCH approach, for 
example, Villaverde and Ramirez (2010) argue that there are no advantages to using GARCH 
process instead of SV for four reasons. First, GARCH process has one less degree of freedom. 
Second, separating level from volatility shocks in GARCH process is significantly difficult. Third, 
it is hard to incorporate GARCH approach in the DSGE framework, preventing DSGE modelers 
from combining theoretical and empirical exploration. Fourth, the GARCH models usually have a 
worse data fitting than the stochastic volatility model.  
Another commonly used approach to modeling volatility is Markov regime switching. This 
approach is a discrete setting compared with the GARCH approach and the stochastic volatility 
approach. All changes occurring will be discrete jumps from one regime to another regime. In the 
real world, we are often not able to clearly figure out that the discrete-sampling data behavior 
results from Markov regime switching or some continuous process, which is first pointed out by 
Diebold (1986). In finance, Ait-Sahalia, Hansen and Scheinkman (2009) propose a continuous-
time Markov process to deal with data. There is consensus that in the real world the volatility in 
many cases is probably a mix of continuous and discrete events, but still, there are events that are 
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easier to interpret a discrete change. For example, the federal funds rate after 2008 reached zero 
lower bound (ZLB) and the Fed lost the leverage of the overnight interest rate. Moreover, the 
approval of Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and the Large-Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) announced in 
late 2008 are all discrete events. Afterwards, the change in operating LSAP can be interpreted as 
continuous events. Later, to make our economic story simpler and more significant, we will use 
regime switching to model the case of observability and that of unobservability in exogenous 
shocks.  
Having discussed the exogenous setting for generating the time-varying volatility, we still 
have a fundamental question still unresolved: where does the time-varying volatility come from? 
This is a more challenging question than modeling the time-varying volatility behavior. 
Economists started to explore some endogenous channels to generate more volatile data. In recent 
studies, Navarro (2014) develops a novel mechanism in which firms’ volatility arises 
endogenously because of financial disruptions. Basu and Bundick (2015) discovered that 
introduction of fluctuations in uncertainty and zero lower bound can well explain the stochastic 
volatility in recent macroeconomic data. Gomes (2017) explores the effect of heterogenous wage 
setting strategies in a macro framework where endogenous fluctuations emerge.  
However, the literature uses rational expectation to model agents’ behavior. As we know, 
the information available in the economy is always limited and usually prevents agents from 
forming rational expectation. Thus, there is a big strand of literature that uses boundedly rational 
expectation or learning to model the endogenous volatility. Marcet and Nicolini (2003) use the 
endogenous switching gain to study hyperinflation. Lansing (2006) uses learning in New 
Keynesian Phillips curve to endogenously generate time-varying volatility. His paper derives the 
optimal variable gain as the fixed point of a nonlinear map that relates the gain to the 
autocorrelation of inflation changes.  
Besides, the observability of macroeconomic shocks has a significant impact on agents’ 
belief or functional form of the forecasting model. Even though we replace rational expectation 
models with learning-based models, without the ability to observe important economic data, the 
assumption for having “correct” functional form of the forecasting model is still unrealistic. For 
simplicity, we only focus on the discussion about the observability of exogenous shocks. Agents 
can only use available data to choose feasible forecasting models and condition expectations on 
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the available data and the chosen forecasting model. Lucas (1973) assumed that aggregate price 
levels were unobserved, and he leveraged this friction to impart real effects of surprise money on 
output. Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Sims (2003) consider informational frictions on rational 
inattention. King and Rebelo (1999) assume that certain types of productivity shocks are 
unobserved. Woodford (2003) argues that expectations are likely to be formed before certain 
shocks are realized. Levine et al (2012) assumes that shocks are not observed by agents leads to 
improved empirical performance in the DSGE framework. Cochrane (2009) argues that the 
monetary policy shock (which is captured by an innovation associated to an instrument rule) 
should not be taken as observable; he finds that there are multiple learnable equilibria even when 
the model is determinate.  
The main contribution of this paper is that we incorporate learning, unobservability and 
regime switching mechanism in the New Keynesian model to provide a theoretical explanation for 
the time-varying macroeconomic volatility. There are several papers that are closely related to our 
paper. Milani (2014) also used learning to generate macroeconomic time-varying volatility. But in 
the model setting, agents endogenously update the gain coefficient according to the past forecast 
errors. The paper does not discuss about the observability of exogenous shocks. Branch and Evans 
(2007, 2011), presenting a framework in which regime changes in volatility arise, is related with 
our paper. However, the paper emphasizes that the under-parametrization of forecasting models is 
important to endogenously generating volatility. But this is unrealistic for third reasons. First, the 
model setting assumes that agents favor parsimony in their forecasting model and select the best 
performing model from the set of underparameterized forecasting models. However, since agents 
have incentives to combine a broader set of variables in improving forecasting performance, the 
selection’s separation of parsimonious forecasting models will not exist. Second, we argue that no 
agents or professional economists in the market would unrealistically use the supply shock as a 
proxy of the demand shock or use the demand shock as a proxy of the supply shock. Third, their 
papers ignore the behavior of agents estimating unobservable shocks according to advanced 
computational techniques. For example, consider preference shocks in the demand side and 
productivity shocks in the supply side. However, when the estimation is considered, some 
estimates are high-quality while some are low-quality. In our paper, we use a regime switching 
between high-quality and low-quality estimates to unify different scenarios: sometimes, some 
agents can perfectly observe true regime-switching-based shocks and some agents can only 
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“observe” low-quality shocks which can be interpreted as low-quality-estimates for shocks; 
sometimes, all agents cannot observe true shocks and they can only accurately estimate the shocks 
in turn according to “hard-to-estimate” structural changes occurring alternatively, which is 
modeled as regime switching mechanism.  
In our paper, we can view the economy as an “expectation-based” game. We discuss three 
cases. First, there is no regime switching. Second, there are observable regime switching where 
some agents (perfect observers) can observe1 which regime dominates and its realized data. Third, 
there is an unobservable regime switching that all agents (imperfect observers) can only observe 
the regime-1 and regime-2 shocks but they cannot know which regime dominates. The second case 
can be usually modeled as a small-sized structural break and the third case can be treated as a big-
sized unprecedented structural break. In small-sized structural breaks, some people can still know 
which regime the economy is stuck in and estimate the macroeconomic shocks by using 
computational methods. However, in unprecedented structural breaks (e.g. 2008 financial crisis), 
people even cannot figure out which regime the economy is in because of the increasing 
uncertainty.  
The three cases will discuss the effect of endogenous expectation mode selection on the 
macroeconomic volatility. We find that in the first case the macroeconomic volatility does not 
seem to behave in the time-varying manner even though the endogenous expectation mode 
selection is allowed. The reason is intuitive. In the structural-break-free economy agents that can 
observe the exogenous shocks will not deviate from their original best-performing forecasting 
model because they will form more “correct” belief on the economy after some-period model 
training. There is no any force to deviate from the stable equilibrium. The volatility of 
macroeconomic data in the stable equilibrium remains constant. However, when structural breaks 
are introduced in the second case and the third case, the regime switching will lead to a time-
varying feature, which is consistent with a large literature about structural changes, see Kim and 
Nelson (1999) and Sensier and Dijk (2004). But the difference is that the second case cannot 
generate a larger volatility when allowing endogenous selection of forecasting models while the 
third case can generate a larger volatility. The reason is about the observability of structural breaks. 
                                                          
1 In this paper, “observe” does not necessarily mean directly “observe” in datasets, and it might also mean 
“estimate” by using advanced computational techniques or algorithms. 
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In the “easy-to-observe” regime-switching economy (case 2), agents who can observe the true 
regime are more likely to continue to use their own forecasting model, thus, the agents do not have 
incentives to deviate from their forecasting model, while other agents without the ability to observe 
the true regime can also only use their “compromising” forecasting models for the expectation 
formation. One thing that is worth pointing out is that when a regime is switched, the perfect 
observer’s forecasting performance is not necessarily best because the regime switching as a shock 
has different impacts on different agents, but after short periods (still in the same regime) the 
perfect observer’s forecasting performance will continue to be the best when the economy in that 
regime converges to the corresponding equilibrium. Hence, the regime switching in the second 
case can give rise to a time-varying volatility, but the exogenous mechanism of expectation mode 
shifts cannot contribute to an extra volatility due to their unwillingness to deviate from their 
forecasting models. In the third case, however, the deviations from their forecasting models will 
happen very frequently, which causes a larger volatility. There are the direct effect and the indirect 
effect. When a regime equilibrium is formed, agents will use this regime’s forecasting model to 
form expectation. Once the regime is switched to the other one, the direct effect is first triggered: 
the regime switching itself as a shock will cause the economy to be volatile; after the regime 
switching is turned on, agents will change their forecasting model to be consistent with the new 
regime, which will result in an extra volatility of macroeconomic data. This is the indirect effect. 
Therefore, continuously speaking, when regimes are switched back and forth, the volatility of 
macroeconomic data is time-varying and larger. In this sense, the indirect effect of the second case 
is very weak.  
Furthermore, we consider the zero lower bound environment, and policy makers must 
consider deflation risk when the economy suffers from a negative shock. Taking unobservability 
into account, macroeconomic volatility will increase. Some action must be taken for avoiding 
inflation risk. Our recommended policy solution is setting an expected inflation based threshold 
under which the policy maker will use a low enough interest rate to boost the economy and above 
which the policy maker will use Taylor-rule based monetary policy. In this setting, we find two 
interesting implications. First, the sharp fluctuations of output and expectation switching keep the 
same pace with policy regime switching, but the inflation does not respond to the policy switching 
strongly. Second, raising expected inflation based threshold reduces the likelihood of the economy 
falling into the deflationary trap, but the likelihood of the economy staying in the aggressive policy 
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regime increases. Raising the threshold boosts the economy more strongly and increases the 
duration of unsustainable boom in output. 
Then we explore two important extensions. First, with unobservability, the policy maker 
faces a dilemma: avoid the deflation risk and maintain the macroeconomic stability. Without the 
unobservability problem, the policy maker may not face such dilemma. The reason is that when 
regime switching occurs endogenous expectation formation will generate larger macroeconomic 
fluctuations (the first-layer amplification mechanism). When the policy maker observes such large 
fluctuations, she must raise the expected inflation based threshold to avoid the deflation spiral. 
However, the higher threshold makes the economy more frequently enter and exit the aggressive 
policy regime, leading to a higher volatility (he second-layer amplification mechanism). Hence, it 
is impossible that the policy maker maintains the macroeconomic stability and avoid the deflation 
risk at the same time. Second, large macroeconomic fluctuations are not necessarily from a bad 
luck or a bad policy. Put it differently, a situation with good-luck shocks and a reasonable policy 
can also generate unexpected fluctuations with unobservability. Put it simply, with unobservability, 
the two layers of amplification mechanism will generate substantial macroeconomic fluctuations 
from a “good-luck” shock. Moreover, the endogenous amplified fluctuations sometimes are not 
mistakenly made by the policy maker because the policy must take a responsibility of avoiding 
deflation risk.  
Before starting our formal model, we generalize the concept of the rational expectation 
based on observable data. Following Evans and McGough (2015), the rational expectation is a 
fixed point of agents’ beliefs. Formally, a general model is  
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑓(𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1, 𝑣𝑡)        (1) 
Let vector spaces of real sequences 𝑌 and 𝑉 be copies of ℝ∞. Assume that there is only one agent 
forming expectation and there is a probability distribution ℋ over  𝑌 × 𝑉. Let 𝑦𝑡 and 𝑣𝑡 be the 
respective history vectors, the belief ℋ determines the conditional distribution of 𝑦𝑡+1 on 𝑦
𝑡 and 
𝑣𝑡. Agents are said to be internally rational if they form expectation as follows 
𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐸
ℋ(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑦
𝑡, 𝑣𝑡)       (2) 
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We say that ℋ  tracks the joint distribution over 𝑌 × 𝑉 . New data 𝑦𝑡  is generated after the 
expectation formation 𝐸ℋ(𝑦𝑡+1|𝑦
𝑡, 𝑣𝑡), and the new data 𝑦𝑡 has a realized probability distribution 
𝑇(ℋ) over 𝑌 × 𝑉 that depends on the agents’ belief ℋ. It is said that internal rational agents are 
externally rational if there is a fixed point of belief 𝑇(ℋ) = ℋ. Thus, we have a formal definition 
of rational expectation equilibrium. 
Definition. A rational expectation equilibrium of a model (1) with expectation formation (2) is a 
probability distribution ℋ over 𝑌 × 𝑉 where 𝑇(ℋ) = ℋ.  
However, rational expectation is not a realistic assumption. There are several reasons. First, 
the rational expectation requires agents to know functional form, but the structure of the economy 
is usually unobservable to agents and needs agents to use data to update their belief on the structure 
of the economy. Second, there are some unobservable fundamental variables that determine the 
evolution of the economy, so agents in this case cannot form rational expectation. Third, agents 
often have different belief systems to choose in the real world, but rational expectation cannot 
allow this situation to occur. In this paper, we introduce the unobservability where agents can only 
forecast using relatively better-performed models which is trained by updated data. In following 
sections, we will also consider heterogenous beliefs. We assume that the aggregate expectation 
operator ?̃?𝑡  is a linear combination of individual expectation operators ?̃?𝑡 = ∑ 𝑛𝑖?̃?𝑡
𝑖𝑛









Chapter 2: Model 
We start with the hybrid New Keynesian model. Following the hybrid IS curve with the backward-
looking term, see Fuhrer (2000), we have  
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼1𝑥𝑡−1 + 𝛼2?̃?𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 − 𝛼3(𝑖𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1) + 𝑒𝑡    (3) 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝜌𝑒𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑒 
Where 𝑥𝑡 is the output gap, 𝑒𝑡~𝐴𝑅(1) is the demand shock and 𝜀𝑡
𝑒~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎𝑒
2). On the other hand, 
following Galí et. al. (2005), we can write the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is 
caused by nominal price rigidity as follows 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜆1𝜋𝑡−1 + 𝜆2?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1 + 𝜆3𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡     (4) 
𝑢𝑡 = 𝜌𝑢𝑢𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑢 
Where 𝜋𝑡  is the inflation, 𝑢𝑡~𝐴𝑅(1)  is the supply shock and 𝜀𝑡
𝑢~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, σu
2) . We follow the 
forward-looking Taylor-type monetary policy rule 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜒𝑥?̃?𝑡𝑥𝑡+1 + 𝜒𝜋?̃?𝑡𝜋𝑡+1       (5) 
Where 𝜒𝑥  and 𝜒𝜋  are the expectational responses from the output gap and the inflation, 
respectively. Putting monetary policy rule back to hybrid IS curve and hybrid Phillips curve, a 
compact form can be written as follow 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴1𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐴2?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡+1 + 𝐴3𝑠𝑡      (6) 
𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 
Where 𝑦𝑡 = (𝑥𝑡, 𝜋𝑡)
′ , 𝑠𝑡 = (𝑒𝑡, 𝑢𝑡)′ ,  𝜀𝑡 = (𝜀𝑡
𝑒 , 𝜀𝑡















𝛼2 − 𝛼3𝜒𝑥 𝛼3 − 𝛼3𝜒𝜋
0 𝜆2









In the following, we will discuss three cases: no regime switching, observable regime switching 




2.1. Case 1: No Regime Switching  
There are two agents in the market, one with the mass n can observe the shock 𝑠𝑡 and the other 
with the mass 1-n cannot observe 𝑠𝑡 . The former (𝑠𝑡  agent) is a fundamental leaner who uses 
fundamental solution to form her expectation and the latter (VAR agent) is VAR learning who 
uses VAR to form her expectation due to unobservability of shock 𝑠𝑡. In the beginning, we treat n 
exogenously. We assume that agents form their expectations after observing 𝑠𝑡 at time t. Thus, the 
forecasting model, also called perceived law of motion (PLM), of the two agents are 
PLM 1: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡𝑠𝑡 
PLM 2: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 
𝐵𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡 are updated by agents after new data is realized. It is worth pointing out that the agent 1 
at time t uses the key exogenous data to predict the macroeconomic data at time t, here, only 
fundamental solution (i.e. no sunspot exists) is considered. while the agent 2 due to a lack of 
exogenous data can only form expectation about the macroeconomic data by using lagged 
endogenous data (VAR). The aggregate expectation is ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡 = n?̃?𝑡
1𝑦𝑡 + (1 − 𝑛)?̃?𝑡
2𝑦𝑡. The timing 
of the “expectation-based” economy is as follows 
 𝐵𝑡−1 and 𝐶𝑡−1 are determined at the end of time t-1;  
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 is realized at the beginning of time t. 
 Form Expectation 
PLM 1: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 => ?̃?𝑡
1𝑦𝑡+1 = ?̃?𝑡
1𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑃𝑠𝑡 
PLM 2: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1 => ?̃?𝑡
2𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑡−1
2 𝑦𝑡−1 
 Generate time-t data 𝑦𝑡 
ALM: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜉1𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑠𝑡 , where 𝜉1𝑡 = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛)𝐴2𝐶𝑡−1
2  and 𝜉2𝑡 =  𝑛𝐴2𝐵𝑡−1𝑃 +
𝐴3, 
 Update 𝐵𝑡 and 𝐶𝑡 with moment method 














 Go back to the first step and repeat the same process, t = t+1 
It is assumed that 𝑠𝑡 is realized before agents’ expectation formation. It is easy to obtain the 
evolution for 𝜉1𝑡 and 𝜉2𝑡 below 
𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟2𝑡)
2 → 𝜉1𝑡+1 
𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡)𝑃 + 𝐴3 → 𝜉2𝑡+1 
Here, there is a fixed point (𝜉1̅ , 𝜉2̅), and Restricted Perception Equilibrium (RPE) is written as 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜉1̅𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜉2̅𝑠𝑡. The difference between RPE and REE is that REE makes PLM and ALM 
consistent while RPE cannot let ALM consistent with PLM. Before obtaining the local stability 
condition, we write the evolution system in a compact way 
𝜉𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝑛(𝜉𝑡) 
Where  
 𝜉𝑡 = (𝜉1𝑡, 𝜉2𝑡)′ 
 𝑇𝑛 = (𝑇𝑛1, 𝑇𝑛2)′  
 𝑇𝑛1(𝜉𝑡) = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟2𝑡)
2 
 𝑇𝑛2(𝜉𝑡) = 𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡)𝑃 + 𝐴3  
Now the local stability condition can be given: 𝐷𝑇𝜉𝑖𝑡 =
𝑑𝑇𝑛𝑖(?̅?𝑡)
𝑑𝜉𝑖𝑡
 has all eigenvalues within the unit 
circle for i=1, 2 




= (1 − 𝑛)(𝜉1̅𝑡 + 𝜉2̅𝑡𝑟2𝑡)
′






 ⨂ denotes the Kronecker product 
Now consider that n is endogenously determined every period. The mechanism is that 𝑠𝑡 agent 
can change her own forecasting model to VAR forecasting model once VAR forecasting model 
performs better than 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model in terms of mean square errors (MSE). It is important to 
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mention that VAR agent cannot use 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model due to her unobservability of 𝑠𝑡 and she 
can only use VAR forecasting model to form her expectation. Formally, at time t, the performance 
is measured by (negative) mean square errors (MSE) 𝑈𝑡
𝑗







𝑦𝑡−1), 𝑗 = 1, 2. Here, 1 stands for 𝑠𝑡 agent and 2 stands for VAR agent. When 𝑈𝑡
1 ≥ 𝑈𝑡
2, the 
𝑠𝑡 agent still uses 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model for her expectation formation. When 𝑈𝑡
1 < 𝑈𝑡
2, the 𝑠𝑡 agent 
uses VAR forecasting model to form expectation. However, when the pure forward looking New 
Keynesian (NK) model is used and 𝑈𝑡
1 < 𝑈𝑡
2 occurs, the mass of agents using VAR forecasting 
model will be 1, which will lead to an explosion in macroeconomic system. Thus, we set a 
threshold  ?̅? such that the mass of agents using VAR forecasting model cannot exceed ?̅?. Thus, 








We can interpret that 𝑇𝑛 and 𝑇1−?̅? define two different paths for the evolution of 𝜉𝑡, where 𝜉𝑡 is 
switched between the two paths based on the relative performance about 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model and 
VAR forecasting model.  
According to figure 3, the graph of model performance shows that st agents always choose st 
model instead of VAR model. It means that st agents always informative signals to forecast and 
VAR model does not contain fundamental information to explain what is happening today, let 
alone forecast for the future. The graphs of output gap and inflation around the steady state show 
that endogenous expectation formation and exogenous expectation formation do not have any 
effects on their fluctuations, because st agents do not change st model to the uninformative VAR 
model. From the graph of volatility, both output volatility and inflation volatility are very stable 
through the whole window. It means that allowing the endogenous expectation formation does not 
help build up the volatility. The figure 6 gives the reason. We see that after the 450th period agents 
in most periods still endogenously choose 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model for expectation formation, which 




Figure 3. This is the case without regime switching where 𝑠𝑡 agents and VAR agents are in the market. In the model 
performance, 1 stands for 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model performing best, 0 stands for VAR forecasting model performing best. 
In volatility and endogeneity, only exogenous expectation formation is allowed before 900 periods and endogenous 
expectation formation is allowed after 900 periods. Mass of 𝑠𝑡 agents n=0.95 and ?̅? = 0.2. 
 
2.2. Case 2: Observable Regime Switching 
Having discussed a basic model only with a single exogenous shock, we transfer our attention to 
more than one exogenous shocks. The reason is that in the real world the shock hitting the 
macroeconomy is different from shocks used to form agents’ expectation. In this paper, we 
introduce regime switching mechanism to formulate our economy.  
Assume that the economy has a shock set S = {𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡
0, 𝑠𝑡
1} . There is regime switching 
mechanism 𝑠𝑡 = 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑠𝑡
0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝑠𝑡
1  and the state 𝑧𝑡 = 0, 1  can be determined by 𝑧𝑡 =
{
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1, . . ,4𝑘 + 3
1, 𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) , and the two shocks have the following evolution 𝑠𝑡+1
0 =
𝑃0𝑠𝑡
0 + 𝜎0𝜀𝑡  and 𝑠𝑡+1
1 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,1). Thus, the evolution of the exogenous 
shock is 𝑠𝑡+1 = 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑃0𝑠𝑡
0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝑃1𝑠𝑡
1 + (1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝜎0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝜎1)𝜀𝑡. There are three agents, 𝑠𝑡 
agent who can observe 𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡
0 agent who can only observe 𝑠𝑡
0 and the VAR agent who can observe 
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nothing in the shock set S. The mass distribution of the three agents is 𝑛 , 𝑛0 , 1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0 , 
respectively. Intuitively, if 𝑧𝑡 = 0, the shock 𝑠𝑡
0 dominates; if 𝑧𝑡 = 1, the shock 𝑠𝑡
1 dominates. We 
can simply interpret the three agents as perfect observer, imperfect observer and blind observer. 
They use signals of different quality to form their own expectations. The quality of signals is 
ordered as 𝑠𝑡 > 𝑠𝑡
0 > 𝑉𝐴𝑅 . In terms of shock formation, this is a discrete setup. The reason why 
such discrete instead of continuous setup is introduced in our model is that there are many 
structural changes when some events occur in the economy, such as the zero-lower bound for the 
monetary policy is reached or the Dodd-Frank Act was approved. However, it is worth pointing 
out that the real-world shocks must be a mix of a discrete case and a continuous case but we want 
to use discrete model for some reasons. First, we want to emphasize the effect of a discrete event 
on the economy. A lot of macroeconomic volatility is closely related to some specific events, for 
example, the economy after 2008 hit zero lower bound. Second, functional forms in continuous 
models are difficult to determine in a micro foundation, and there are many variations in ad hoc 
settings. Originally, we have initial mass distribution of agents 𝑛, 𝑛0 and 1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0. However, 
over time, when agents release their forecasting performance based on mean square error every 
period, observe each other’s performance and determine their own forecasting models for a period 
ahead. Due to the limitation in the observability of shocks, different agents have different feasible 
set of forecasting models. VAR agent cannot choose other forecasting models no matter how good 
other models perform. 𝑠𝑡
0 agent can use VAR forecasting model if her 𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting model is 
weaker than VAR model, but she cannot choose 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model due to her unobservability 
of shock 𝑠𝑡 . 𝑠𝑡  agent can shift either to VAR forecasting model or to 𝑠𝑡
0  forecasting model if 
needed. There is one point needed to emphasize. When the VAR forecasting model has best 
performance and all agents will choose VAR to form expectation, but in the standard New 
Keynesian model (pure forward looking), if VAR’s expectation formation is made, the economic 
system may explode. To avoid an explosion of macroeconomic system, we set a threshold ?̅? = 0.2 
such that there is only a mass ?̅? of VAR agents. The three agents’ forecasting models (i.e., PLM) 
are as follows,  
PLM 1 for type 1 agent: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 





PLM 3 for type 3 agent: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 
The expectation formations of 𝑠𝑡  agent, 𝑠𝑡
0  agent and VAR agent are ?̃?𝑡







2 𝑦𝑡−1, respectively. It is easy to obtain the 
aggregate expectation ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝑛?̃?𝑡
1𝑦𝑡 + 𝑛0?̃?𝑡
2𝑦𝑡 + (1 − 𝑛0 − 𝑛)?̃?𝑡
3𝑦𝑡 . Now we write the 
macroeconomic system in a compact way 






0 + 𝜎0𝜀𝑡 
𝑠𝑡+1
1 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡 
𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,1) 
𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1, . . ,4𝑘 + 3
1, 𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) 
At the time t, the timeline is as follows 
 𝐵𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝑡−1
0  and 𝐶𝑡−1 are updated at the end of time t-1;  
 Based on Q and 𝑧𝑡−1, 𝑧𝑡 is realized at time t. 
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡−1 + 1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1)𝑠𝑡−1
0 + (1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝜎0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝜎1)𝜀𝑡 is realized at the beginning of 
time t.  
 Form Expectation 
PLM 1: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 => ?̃?𝑡
1𝑦𝑡+1 = ?̃?𝑡
1𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝐵𝑡−1(𝑃1𝑠𝑡 + 1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1)𝑠𝑡
0) 














 Endogenize 𝑛 and 𝑛0: 𝑈𝑡
𝑗








1 ≥ max {𝑈𝑡
2, 𝑈𝑡
3}: the mass of 𝑠𝑡 agent is n. 
 𝑈𝑡
2 ≥ 𝑈𝑡
3: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 𝑛0 and the mass of VAR agent is 1 − 𝑛0 − 𝑛 
 𝑈𝑡
2 < 𝑈𝑡
3: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 0 and the mass of VAR agent is 1 − 𝑛 
o 𝑈𝑡
2 > max {𝑈𝑡
1, 𝑈𝑡
3}: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 𝑛0 + 𝑛, the mass of 𝑠𝑡 agent is 0 and the 
mass of VAR agent is 1 − 𝑛0 − 𝑛 
o 𝑈𝑡
3 > max {𝑈𝑡
1, 𝑈𝑡




and the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 𝑛0 +
1−?̅?−𝑛−𝑛0
2
   
 Generate time-t data 𝑦𝑡 
ALM: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝜉1𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑠𝑡
0 
o 𝜉1𝑡 = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0)𝐴2𝐶𝑡−1
2 ,  
o 𝜉2𝑡 =  𝑛𝐴2𝐵𝑡−1𝑃1 + 𝐴3  
o 𝜉3𝑡 = 𝑛𝐴2𝐵𝑡−11[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1) + 𝑛0𝐴2𝐵𝑡−1
0 𝑃0 
 Update 𝐵𝑡, 𝐵𝑡
0 and 𝐶𝑡 with moment method (see Appendix) 








































 Update t = t+1, repeat this process 
Now fixing 𝑧𝑡, 𝑛 and 𝑛0, the evolution system for  𝜉1𝑡, 𝜉2𝑡 and 𝜉3𝑡 is 
𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦0𝑡)
2 → 𝜉1𝑡+1 
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𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐴3 → 𝜉2𝑡+1 
𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑡)1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1) + 𝑛0𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡)𝑃0 → 𝜉3𝑡+1 
Compactly put, we have 
𝜉𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡(𝜉𝑡) 
 𝜉𝑡 = (𝜉1𝑡, 𝜉2𝑡, 𝜉3𝑡)′ 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡 = (𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
1 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
2 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
3 )′  
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
1 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦0𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦1𝑡)
2 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
2 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠0𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐴3 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
3 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝑛𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠0𝑡)1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1) + 𝑛0𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑠1𝑡 +
𝜉3𝑡)𝑃0 
The local stability condition is that 𝐷𝑇𝜉𝑖𝑡 =
𝑑𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡(?̅?𝑡)
𝑑𝜉𝑖𝑡
 has all eigenvalues within the unit circle 
for i=1, 2, 3 





= (1 − 𝑛 − 𝑛0)(𝜉1̅𝑡 + 𝜉2̅𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦0𝑡 + 𝜉3̅𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦1𝑡)
′
⨂𝐴2 + (1 − 𝑛 −











= 𝑛 (𝑟𝑠𝑠0𝑡1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1))
′
⨂𝐴2 + 𝑛0𝑃0′⨂𝐴2 
 ⨂ denotes the Kronecker product 
Now consider that 𝑛 and 𝑛0 are endogenously determined. This endogenous evolution path 


































Now, we assign 𝑛 = 0.85 and 𝑛0 = 0.1, and ?̅? = 0.2, and simulate the economy 50 times.  
 
Figure 4. This is the case of regime switching without unobservability. green line is 𝑠𝑡
0-model-based expectation and 
yellow line is VAR-based expectation. In the model performance, 1 stands for 𝑠𝑡 forecasting model performing best, 
0 stands for 𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting model performing best and -1 stands for VAR forecasting model performing best. 
According to figure 4, there are two interesting phenomena. 
1. There is no significant difference after allowing endogenous expectation formation, and 
the expectation is usually switched between 𝑠𝑡
0 model and 𝑠𝑡 model. 
2. Endogenous expectation formation does not generate more volatility in output and inflation 
For the first phenomenon, after allowing endogenous expectation formation (after 450th period), 
the frequency of agents choosing 𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting model compared to that before 100th period does 
not significantly change, which implies that the endogenous expectation formation mechanism 
does not lead to a huge change in the way of agents choosing the best-performed models. Another 
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interesting thing is that the model choice is always between 𝑠𝑡
0 model and 𝑠𝑡  model, not VAR 
model. It means that VAR model does not give a better fitting and explain what is going on today 
and let alone forecast for the future. When 𝑠𝑡
0 is dominant, 𝑠𝑡
0 model might be selected by 𝑠𝑡 agent; 
when 𝑠𝑡
1  is dominant, 𝑠𝑡  model might be chosen by 𝑠𝑡  agent. Even though the best-performed 
models are often switched between 𝑠𝑡 model and 𝑠𝑡
0 model, the aggregate expectation does not 
necessarily shift that much. The reason is that when 𝑠𝑡
0 model overperforms other models, the 
dominant regime is very likely to be 𝑠𝑡
0 model, and 𝑠𝑡 agent’s expectation should be the same no 
matter whether she use 𝑠𝑡
0 model or 𝑠𝑡 model. Hence, the mass distribution change does not mean 
that the aggregate expectation changes. For the second phenomenon, since the aggregate 
expectation does not change that much between exogenous expectation formation and endogenous 
expectation formation, it is clear that the evolution path of output gap and inflation should not be 
different. 
 
2.3. Case 3: Unobservable Regime Switching 
Now we consider a further case where all agents cannot observe 𝑠𝑡 which has a direct impact on 
the economy. Assume that the economy has a shock set S = {𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡
0, 𝑠𝑡
1}. There is regime switching 
mechanism 𝑠𝑡 = 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑠𝑡
0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝑠𝑡
1  and the state 𝑧𝑡 = 0, 1  can be determined by 𝑧𝑡 =
{
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1, . . ,4𝑘 + 3
1, 𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) , and the two shocks have the following evolution 𝑠𝑡+1
0 =
𝑃0𝑠𝑡
0 + 𝜎0𝜀𝑡  and 𝑠𝑡+1
1 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡
1 + 𝜎1𝜀𝑡 , where 𝜀𝑡~𝑁(0,1). Thus, the evolution of the exogenous 
shock is 𝑠𝑡+1 = 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑃0𝑠𝑡
0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝑃1𝑠𝑡
1 + (1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝜎0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝜎1)𝜀𝑡. There are two agents, 𝑠𝑡
10 
agent who can observe 𝑠𝑡
1 and 𝑠𝑡
0 and the VAR agent who can observe nothing in the shock set S. 
The mass distributions of the two agents is 𝑛10 and 1 − 𝑛10, respectively. For convenience, we 
will use 𝑠𝑡
0 agent and 𝑠𝑡
1 agent to represent the 𝑠𝑡
10 agent in different cases, one for 𝑠𝑡
10 agent using 
𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting model and one for using 𝑠𝑡
1 forecasting model. The mass distribution of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent 
and 𝑠𝑡
1  agent and VAR agent is 𝑛0 , 𝑛1  and 1 − 𝑛0 − 𝑛1.  Here, 𝑛10 = 𝑛0 + 𝑛1 . When 𝑠𝑡
0 
forecasting model overperforms other models,  𝑛1 = 0; symmetrically, when 𝑠𝑡
1 forecasting model 
overperforms other models,  𝑛0 = 0. We can simply interpret this case as one where all agents do 
not have perfect information about which exogenous shock hits the economy. In some sense, in 
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some parameter setting, 𝑠𝑡
1 and 𝑠𝑡
0 are good proxies for 𝑠𝑡. When 𝑧𝑡 = 0, 𝑠𝑡
0 is exactly 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡
1 is 
a “bad-quality” proxy of 𝑠𝑡. When 𝑧𝑡 = 1, 𝑠𝑡
1 is exactly 𝑠𝑡 and 𝑠𝑡
0 is a “bad-quality” proxy of 𝑠𝑡. 
Different from the previous model, 𝑠𝑡
10 agent can observe two exogenous shocks but is not sure 
about the true exogenous shock 𝑠𝑡 . She can base her expectation formation on the relative 
performance among all forecasting models. She would use VAR forecasting model if both of 𝑠𝑡
0 
and 𝑠𝑡
1 forecasting model are weaker than VAR model and in many cases she would be more likely 
to use one of 𝑠𝑡
1 and 𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting models due to the fact that some information is better than no 
information, but since the shock 𝑠𝑡  is unobservable to 𝑠𝑡
10 agent, she cannot use 𝑠𝑡  forecasting 
model for her expectation formation; On the other hand, VAR agent cannot choose 𝑠𝑡
1 forecasting 
model or 𝑠𝑡
0 forecasting model due to her unobservability of shocks in the shock set S. Similarly, 
when the VAR forecasting model is best in performance we set the threshold ?̅? < 1 such that there 
is only a mass ?̅? of VAR agents in order for avoiding the explosion in the pure forward-looking 
NK model. The three agents’ forecasting models (i.e., PLM) are as follows,  
PLM 1: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1
1 𝑠𝑡
1 
PLM 2: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1
0 𝑠𝑡
0 
PLM 3: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 
The expectation formations of 𝑠𝑡
1  agent and 𝑠𝑡







0  and ?̃?𝑡
3𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1
2 𝑦𝑡−1 , respectively. It is easy to obtain the aggregate 
expectation ?̃?𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝑛1?̃?𝑡
1𝑦𝑡 + 𝑛0?̃?𝑡
2𝑦𝑡 + (1 − 𝑛0 − 𝑛1)?̃?𝑡
3𝑦𝑡. Now we write the macroeconomic 
system in a compact way 






0 + 𝜎0𝜀𝑡 
𝑠𝑡+1
1 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡





0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1, . . ,4𝑘 + 3
1, 𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) 
Expectation-based economy is evolving as follows 
 𝐵𝑡−1
1  , 𝐵𝑡−1
0  and 𝐶𝑡−1 are determined at the end of time t-1;  
 Based on Q and 𝑧𝑡−1, 𝑧𝑡 is realized at time t.  
 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑃1𝑠𝑡−1 + 1[𝑧𝑡=0](𝑃0 − 𝑃1)𝑠𝑡−1
0 + (1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝜎0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝜎1)𝜀𝑡 is realized at the beginning of 
time t.  
o Derivation: 𝑠𝑡 = 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑃0𝑠𝑡−1
0 + 𝑃1(𝑠𝑡 − 1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝑠𝑡−1
0 ) + (1[𝑧𝑡=0]𝜎0 + 1[𝑧𝑡=1]𝜎1)𝜀𝑡 
 Form Expectation 


















PLM 2: 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡−1𝑦𝑡−1 => ?̃?𝑡
2𝑦𝑡+1 = 𝐶𝑡−1
2 𝑦𝑡−1 
 Endogenize 𝑛 and 𝑛0: 𝑈𝑡
𝑗









1 > max {𝑈𝑡
2, 𝑈𝑡
3}: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
1 agent is 𝑛10, the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 0 and the mass 
of VAR agent is 1 − 𝑛10 
o 𝑈𝑡
2 > max {𝑈𝑡
1, 𝑈𝑡
3}: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
1 agent is 0, the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 𝑛10 and the mass 




2: the mass of 𝑠𝑡
1 agent is 1 − ?̅?, the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 0 and the mass 




1:  the mass of 𝑠𝑡
1 agent is 0, the mass of 𝑠𝑡
0 agent is 1 − ?̅? and the mass 
of VAR agent is ?̅? 
 Generate time-t data 𝑦𝑡  





o 𝜉1𝑡 = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛10)𝐴2𝐶𝑡−1
2 ,  
o 𝜉2𝑡 = 𝑛1𝐴2𝐵𝑡−1
1 𝑃1 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=1]    
o 𝜉3𝑡 = 𝑛0𝐴2𝐵𝑡−1
0 𝑃0 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=0]  
 Update 𝐵𝑡
1, 𝐵𝑡
0 and 𝐶𝑡 with moment method 
𝐵𝑡






1′)−1  and 














0′)−1  and 













−1  and 







 Update t = t+1, repeat this process 
Fixing 𝑧𝑡, 𝑛1 and 𝑛0, the evolution system for  𝜉1𝑡, 𝜉2𝑡 and 𝜉3𝑡 is written as 
𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛1 − 𝑛0)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠1𝑦𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠0𝑦𝑡)
2 → 𝜉1𝑡+1 
𝑛1𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠0𝑠1𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=1] → 𝜉2𝑡+1 
𝑛0𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠1𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡)𝑃0 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=0] → 𝜉3𝑡+1 
Writing the system into a compact form, we have 
𝜉𝑡+1 = 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡(𝜉𝑡) 
 𝜉𝑡 = (𝜉1𝑡, 𝜉2𝑡, 𝜉3𝑡)′ 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡 = (𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
1 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
2 , 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
3 )′  
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
1 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝐴1 + (1 − 𝑛1 − 𝑛0)𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠1𝑦𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠0𝑦𝑡)
2 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
2 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝑛1𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡𝑟𝑠0𝑠1𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=1] 
 𝑇𝑛,𝑛0,𝑧𝑡
3 (𝜉𝑡) = 𝑛0𝐴2(𝜉1𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠1𝑠0𝑡 + 𝜉3𝑡)𝑃0 + 𝐴31[𝑧𝑡=0]  
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The local stability condition is obtained: 𝐷𝑇𝜉𝑖𝑡 =
𝑑𝑇𝑖(?̅?𝑡)
𝑑𝜉𝑖𝑡
 has all eigenvalues within the unit circle 
for i=1, 2, 3 




= (1 − 𝑛1 − 𝑛0)(𝜉1̅𝑡 + 𝜉2̅𝑡𝑟𝑠1𝑦𝑡 + 𝜉3̅𝑡𝑟𝑠0𝑦𝑡)
′
⨂𝐴2 + (1 − 𝑛1 −










 ⨂ denotes the Kronecker product 
Now consider that 𝑛1 and 𝑛0 are endogenized. This endogenous evolution path can be split 
























Now, we assign 𝑛1 = 0.5 and 𝑛0 = 0.5, and ?̅? = 0.2, and simulate the economy 50 times. Here, 
we do not let VAR agents exist in the model, but the agents can use VAR model for expectation 
formation.  
According to figure 5, there are two interesting features. After allowing endogenous 
expectation formation,  
1. Endogenous expectation formation makes output and inflation more volatile.  
2. Agents’ st
1  expectation and st
0  expectation is more volatile than those in the case with 
exogenous expectation formation. 
From the graph of volatility, it is clear to see that the endogenous expectation formation will make 
output and inflation volatile. There is an amplification mechanism. When we fix the mass 
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distribution of agents, the aggregate expectation is always from a half-and-half combination of st
0 
expectation and st
1 expectation; however, once the mass distribution of agents can freely shift 
based on their performance, the aggregate expectation will come from either st
0 expectation or st
1 
expectation. When regime is switching from st
0 to st
1, the model performance will give agents a 
signal of expectation switching from st
0 expectation to st
1 expectation, a structural break will show 
up in aggregate expectation, which gives rise to a large volatility in output and inflation. When 
regime switching occurs very frequently, the endogenous expectation switching will happen 
frequently as well. The second feature is very interesting. First, why are st
0 expectation and st
1 
expectation more volatile than those in the case with exogenous expectation formation? The reason 
is that the actual output and inflation data is more volatile than the case of exogenous expectation 
formation, and the volatile data will return a volatile coefficient system for st
0 model and st
1 model, 
leading to a volatile expectation.  
 
Figure 5. This is the case of regime switching with unobservability. In the model performance, 1 stands for 𝑠𝑡
1  
forecasting model performing best, 0 stands for 𝑠𝑡
0  forecasting model performing best and -1 stands for VAR 
forecasting model performing best. 
Combining the first and second feature, we can find a more interesting point, that is, the 
increased volatility of macroeconomic data and the increased volatility of expectation can be 




2.4. Visualization of the Effects: Regime Switching Shocks and Endogenous 
Expectation Switching Shocks 
We use the absolute value of first order difference of macroeconomic paths as measurement for 
volatility. The reason is that we would like to measure the length of every step the economy moves 
forward, where this is only dependent on the current state and not on the historical path. In this 
sense, this measure is better than the traditional variance in a specific sample or rolling-window 
samples.  
First, we look at the effect of regime switching shock. In doing so, we use two cases to 
compare: one case is that the endogenous expectation switching shock is shut down and the regime 
switching shock is opened; the other case is that both shocks are shut down. Practically, setting the 
expectation formation exogenously is the shutdown of endogenous expectation switching shock 
and setting a very infrequent regime switching 𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 100𝑘 + 1, … , 100𝑘 + 99
1,  𝑡 = 100𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) 
represents a shutdown of regime switching shocks and setting a very frequent regime switching 
𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1,… , 4𝑘 + 3
1,  𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) represents cyclical regime switching shocks. To avoid 
the effect of fundamental shocks, we set AR(1) st
0  process and st
1  process having the same 
variance by balancing convergence speed and the variance of white noise, see the figure below. In 
the following figure, we see two features. First, for both output and inflation, the step length of the 
economy moving forward as volatility with regime switching shocks is much larger than that 
without regime switching shocks, which is indicated by the fact that the volatility of output 
increases from less than 10−4 to more than 3 ∗ 10−4 in the following graph. In this sense, the 
effect of regime switching shocks is more important than the effect of fundamental shocks, 
especially on output. Second, the output is more sensitive to regime switching shocks than inflation. 
It is clear that the left graph indicates that frequent regime switching shocks make the volatility of 
output surpass the volatility of inflation. Moreover, from the right graph, it also shows that the 




Figure 6. The left graph is 𝑠𝑡
0 process and the right graph is 𝑠𝑡
1 process 
 
Figure 7. Regime switching shock with exogenous expectation formation 
 
Second, we look at the effect of endogenous switching shock. In similar logic, we set a 
frequent regime switching as 𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1,… , 4𝑘 + 3
1,  𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ)  and allow endogenous 
expectation formation (the left graph) relative to exogenous expectation formation (the right graph). 
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There are two interesting points. First, endogenous expectation switching shocks drive more 
fluctuations in both output and inflation and the output is more sensitive to expectation switching 
shocks. Second, there are many impulsive peaks in the left-hand graph. In the right-hand graph, 
without expectation switching shocks, the volatility of output and inflation is roughly between 5 ∗
10−5 and 3 ∗ 10−4. However, in the left-hand graph, the volatility of inflation lies between 5 ∗
10−5 and 4 ∗ 10−4, and the volatility of output gap can reach 10−3, meaning that the effect of 
endogenous expectation switching shocks is much larger than that of regime switching shocks. 
There is an interesting amplification mechanism. An endogenous expectation switching shock is 
usually driven by a regime switching shock and it cannot exist without the regime switching. 
Therefore, an endogenous expectation switching shock can be viewed as an amplifier based on 
regime switching shocks. 
 
Figure 8. Endogenous expectation switching shocks 
In sum, it is seen that the effect of the regime switching shocks is much larger than that of 
the fundamental shocks on the volatility of output and inflation and the endogenous expectation 
switching shocks as an amplifier are much larger than that of regime switching shocks. Moreover, 
the volatility of output is sensitive to both shocks, especially to endogenous expectation switching 
shock.   
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Chapter 3: Policy Implications at Zero Lower Bound 
Having seen how the unobservability generates a greater macroeconomic volatility in the previous 
section, we discuss the monetary policy implication in this section. We consider the possibility of 
zero lower bound and assume that the central bank sets an inflation target ?̅?, say 0.5% per quarter, 
so the policy maker sets the policy rate as  
𝑖𝑡 = 𝑖







?̅?  which guarantees that one equilibrium inflation is ?̅? . 
Therefore, there are two equilibria: one is a healthy equilibrium (?̅?, ?̅?), and the other is a deflation 
equilibrium (?̅?𝑑, ?̅?𝑑), represented by the graph below. 
 
Figure 9. ZLB and two equilibria 
 
In this section, to investigate the role of unobservability on the deflation risk and the policy 
setting, we only consider the case where agents can observe 𝑠𝑡
0 or 𝑠𝑡
1 but not 𝑠𝑡.  It is interesting 
that greater macroeconomic fluctuations driven by the endogenous expectation switching would 
push the economy to the deflation equilibrium, in which case a traditional policy making usually 
fails to avoid deflation risk if policy makers only consider exogenous shocks. We will visualize 
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the effects of two shocks -regime switching shock and endogenous expectation switching shock- 
in different parameter settings, and then explore how the policy rate threshold is able to avoid as 
much as possible the economy to fall in a deflationary trap. 
 
3.1. Simulations 
Considering zero lower bound, there are two equilibria: the healthy equilibrium (?̅?, ?̅?) and the 
deflationary equilibrium (?̅?𝑑, ?̅?𝑑). When shocks are large enough, the economy will evolve and 
fall into the deflationary trap ?̅?𝑑, which must be avoided by the policy maker.  Policy makers are 
assumed to use an expected inflation based threshold ?̃?  as an alert: when agents’ aggregate 
inflation expectation is above ?̃?, policy makers use the standard Taylor rule for policy making; 
when the expected inflation is lower than the threshold ?̃?, policy makers use an aggressive policy 
rate 𝜑, calibrated as 0.1%, to boost the economy. If the inflation is below ?̃? which is calibrated as 
0.25%, the economy is counted as be stuck in a deflationary trap.  
We do simulations as follows. Imagine that the economy starts from a positive shock, where a 
half of agents live in each unconnected informational island, meaning that expectation is formed 
exogenously. After 4000 periods, their information can be exchanged, that is, informational islands 
are connected, meaning that agents’ expectation is formed endogenously. All agents use historical 
data to update the same forecasts for every step, and continue until 5000 periods. In between, when 
the expected inflation is less than this threshold, the policy maker would abandon Taylor rule and 
switch to an aggressive policy rate, say 0.1% ≪ ?̅?, instead until the expected inflation goes above 
the threshold. We repeat the economic scenarios 10 times and 50 times. We track the evolution of 
the economy. We care about several things under different parametrization in threshold value ?̃? 
and the connectivity of islands: aggressive policy switching frequency, deflation frequency, time-
varying model performance and the convergence time and stability of the convergence path. 
 Baseline model 
We start with a model with a threshold ?̃? = 0.003, 4-cycle regime switching and endogenous 




three consecutive periods and then jumps to regime 𝑠𝑡
1 and immediately jumps back to regime 𝑠𝑡
0 
after one period. The reason why we set 4-cycle is that we want a relatively frequent regime 
switching to simulate an economy with frequent structural changes. From graphs of output gap 
and inflation, we have three interesting findings. First, when islands are connected, the economy 
converges very fast. The economy converges to the equilibrium very slowly and such equilibrium 
is a restricted perception equilibrium that is different from the healthy or the deflation equilibrium, 
and the reason is that the “wrong” expectational feedback matters to the economy and cannot be 
corrected through shifting to the best-performed model. After endogenous expectation formation 
is allowed, the economy immediately converges to the area around one equilibrium. Second, large 
output fluctuations are exactly consistent with policy switching, but inflation does not respond that 
strongly to policy switching. When the economy is stuck in the low inflation expectation, the 
policy would be switched to an aggressive policy regime to stay away from the deflationary trap, 
but the demand would immediately respond to the low interest rate environment leading to 
boosting economic growth. However, inflation does not have such large reactions because the 
price level does not directly response to interest rates but the relation between demand and supply. 
Third, the best-performed model switching is consistent with policy switching. Furthermore, the 
result shows that agents prefer VAR models during the policy switching. The reason is that when 
the economy is switched to a different policy regime, the situations would become more 
complicated for forecasting, and market participants would take some time to figure out what 
factor would be the good fit to explain what is happening today and use it for forecasting tomorrow. 
Such complicated scenarios lead agents to behaving in a conservative way, meaning that they give 
up identifying which is the dominant regime of fundamentals.  
The following table shows the aggressive policy switch frequency and deflation frequency 
in all periods the economy experiences. The number of simulations is how many times the 
economy goes through 5000 periods and all periods are the number of simulations times 5000 
periods. When we simulate the economy 50 times, the economy experiences 54.75% of aggressive 




Figure 10. Policy switching threshold ?̃? = 0.003 and regime switching 𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1,… , 4𝑘 + 3
1,  𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) and 
the endogenous expectation formation is allowed after 900 periods. In model performance, 1 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
1 model 
outperforms other models, 0 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
0  model outperforms other models and -1 denotes that VAR model 
outperforms other models. In policy switching and deflationary trap, 1 in policy switching denotes Taylor-rule policy 
used and 0 in policy switching denotes aggressive policy used; 1 in deflationary trap denotes that the economy is stuck 






Table 1. ?̃? = 0.003 and 4-cycle regime switching 
 
 Infrequent Regime Switching Model 
Consider the economy experiences the infrequent regime switching with 12-cycle where the 
economy stays in regime 𝑠𝑡
0 for 11 consecutive periods and in regime 𝑠𝑡
1 for one period. There are 
two attractive questions for one-life simulation. First, why doesn’t the policy switch? Why doesn’t 




10 59.57% 33.41% 
50 54.75% 27.21% 
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the economy fall into the deflationary trap? The straightforward source is due to smaller regime 
switching shocks resulting in smaller endogenous expectation switching shocks. When macro 
fluctuations get smaller, the economy would usually go around the healthy equilibrium, and 
expected inflation would be stable and not smaller than the alert threshold. Therefore, the policy 
switching does not occur that frequently, making the macroeconomic volatility smaller and more 
stable, so there are no excessive fluctuations in output and inflation. 
Having simulated 10 times and 50 times, from the following table showing the aggressive 
policy switch frequency and deflation frequency in all periods the economy experiences, we can 
see that the economy experiences 0.86% of aggressive policy switching and stays in deflationary 
trap in only 0.42% of all periods when we simulate the economy 10 times. When simulating the 
economy 50 times, the two numbers are still not changed that much: the probability of the policy 
maker using an aggressive policy is 1.25% and the economy has the probability of 0.38% in falling 
into a deflationary trap. Clearly, the infrequent regime switching depresses the endogenous 





Figure 11. Policy switching threshold ?̃? = 0.003 and regime switching 𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 12𝑘 + 1,… , 12𝑘 + 11
1,  𝑡 = 12𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) 
and the endogenous expectation formation is allowed after 900 periods. In model performance, 1 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
1 
model outperforms other models, 0 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
0 model outperforms other models and -1 denotes that VAR model 
outperforms other models. In policy switching and deflationary trap, 1 in policy switching denotes Taylor-rule policy 
used and 0 in policy switching denotes aggressive policy used; 1 in deflationary trap denotes that the economy is stuck 





Table 2. ?̃? = 0.003 and 4-cycle regime switching 
 
 A Model with a higher the Expected Inflation Based Threshold 
We consider the effect of raising the alert threshold from ?̃? = 0.003 to ?̃? = 0.004. When the policy 
maker realizes that the regime switching can generate more endogenous volatility from connecting 
informational islands, they must raise an alert threshold ?̃? to avoid inflation risk. However, there 
are two side products. First, a higher threshold leads to stronger fluctuations in output and inflation. 
In higher expected inflation environment, the economy stays in a low policy rate environment, 
boosting the economic activities and inflation more than in lower expected inflation environment. 
Second, the unsustainable boom in output lasts longer period. Clearly, the economy is more likely 
to stay in an aggressive policy environment if the policy maker worries about and want to avoid 
the deflation spiral.  
In sum, the following table summarizes the three cases above. We can find that infrequent 
regime switching results in less volatility in the macroeconomy and an aggressive policy is used 
rarely. From the graph above, we already know that there are no large output fluctuations when an 
aggressive policy regime is not often reached. In this sense, there are two-level excessive volatility: 
one is from endogenous expectation switching and the other is from policy regime switching. What 
is worth emphasizing is that switching to an aggressive policy regime would lead to a considerable 




10 0.86% 0.42% 
50 1.25% 0.38% 
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but unexpected output volatility. Hence, when the policy maker compromises and raise the alert 
threshold ?̃? to maintain inflation expectation to an acceptable level and then low deflation risk 
which is shown to be reduced roughly from 27% to 16%, the frequency of the policy switching 
gets higher, that is, from around 55% to 67%, then it is shown in the above graph that 
macroeconomic fluctuations get larger. 
 
Figure 12. Policy switching threshold ?̃? = 0.004 and regime switching 𝑧𝑡 = {
0, 𝑡 = 4𝑘 + 1,… , 4𝑘 + 3
1,  𝑡 = 4𝑘
(𝑘 ∈ ℕ) and 
the endogenous expectation formation is allowed after 900 periods. In model performance, 1 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
1 model 
outperforms other models, 0 denotes that 𝑠𝑡
0  model outperforms other models and -1 denotes that VAR model 
outperforms other models. In policy switching and deflationary trap, 1 in policy switching denotes Taylor-rule policy 
used and 0 in policy switching denotes aggressive policy used; 1 in deflationary trap denotes that the economy is stuck 
in the deflationary trap and 0 in deflationary trap denotes that the economy is away from deflationary trap. 
 













10 59.57% 33.41% 0.86% 0.42% 68.67% 11.63% 
50 54.75% 27.21% 1.25% 0.38% 66.93% 15.87% 
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Table 3. Comparison in the frequency of aggressive policy regime switching and the frequency of the deflation between 
baseline model, the model with infrequent regime switching and the model with a higher alert threshold.  
3.2. Discussions 
We discuss two topics in this section. First, without unobservability, the economy staying in 
healthy equilibrium suffers from small shocks, policy makers do not worry that the economy would 
enter a deflationary spiral. Policy makers’ goal is only to maintain the macroeconomic stability. 
But with unobservability leading larger shocks generated by frequent endogenous expectation 
switching, policy makers must consider not only to maintain macroeconomic stability, but also to 
avoid deflation risk even under a small negative shock. Second, the macroeconomics literature has 
been exploring an interesting but long-lasting question: what is the reason for large 
macroeconomic fluctuations? Bad policy, bad structural change or bad policy? This questions 
sometimes is not simple, because often they are endogenous, see Bernanke (2004). We will 
investigate the effect of unobservability on the two issues.  
3.2.1. Policy Makers’ Dilemma with Unobservability 
When fundamental shocks are small enough and there is the unobservability problem, the policy 
maker does not need to worry about the deflation risk. The only thing that policy makers care about 
is how to maintain the macroeconomic stability. The solution to this problem is suggested by 
Bernanke (2004), who argues that to maintain macroeconomic stability policy makers must avoid 
a bad cycle: attempts to achieve higher output lower interest rates, and then it leads to an increase 
in inflation, and policy makers tighten the policy for rising inflation and then make a sharp 
contraction in output. However, once we consider that the economy has the unobservability 
problem, the unobservability in the dominant regimes would generate a substantial endogenous 
volatility, which results in that a small negative fundamental shock can be amplified to be a very 
large one, probably making the economy fall into a deflationary spiral. Therefore, policy makers 
must use an aggressive policy to protect the economy from deflation risk in advance. But the 
problem if policy makers take this step is that when the inflation expectation sometimes is a little 
low but the current inflation is still good, the low policy rate would boost the economic activities 
and inflation very quickly and strongly. Since the threshold is higher, the economy is more likely 
to be in the aggressive policy regime so that the unstable and large volatility in output would last 
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longer. In this case, policy makers face a dilemma: to avoid deflation risk, policy makers must 
raise the alert threshold which leading to macroeconomic instability. It is worth pointing out that 
such dilemma does not exist if there is no unobservability problem.  
 
Figure 13. The relationship among macroeconomic volatility, policy switching and deflation risk 
 
3.2.2. Volatility: Bad Luck or Bad Policy? 
Much traditional literature widely discusses where the substantial macroeconomic volatility comes 
from. There are three typical sources: bad luck, structural change and bad policy. Until now, 
looking for a starting point of macroeconomic volatility is far from settled. For example, 
researchers have been exploring why the volatility in the macroeconomy gets smaller after 1980, 
which, a reduced volatility, is opposite from what we care about under zero lower bound. Some 
economists agree with good luck. Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004) shows that 50%~75% of the 
reduction of output volatility since 1980s is from good luck. However, they also argue that almost 
all the reduction of inflation volatility since 1980s is from good policy. Stock and Watson (2003) 
draw a similar conclusion with Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004), but they also investigate the 
relation between US and G-7 countries that part of the reduction in volatility is from the reduction 
in common international shocks between countries. Some other researchers emphasize the 
importance of structural changes. Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) find that the 
improvement in inventory management techniques is the most important reason that output 
becomes less volatile because a decline in the inventory volatility smooths the output volatility. 
Dynan, Elmendorf and Sichel (2005) explain that the output volatility is reduced through 
efficiency-improved financial market. They found that the financial services are more and more 
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dependent on online transaction platforms which has been improved aggressively so that people 
are easier to have access to financial markets and easier to get loans or other financial services, 
which smooths consumption and then output. Some economists think that good luck or good 
structural changes result from good policies. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) argue that before 
1979, Fed did raise the nominal interest rate but the real interest rate still declined because the 
expected inflation goes up more quickly than nominal interest rates do. The policy maker raised 
the nominal interest rate and real interest rate aggressively after 1980s so that the high-inflation 
economy then cooled down. Bernanke (2004) argues that there is a bad cycle before 1979: initially, 
policy makers lower interest rates to attempt to achieve higher output, and then inflation would 
rise very quickly which is unexpected, so the policy would be tightened, leading to a sharp 
contraction in output, and policy makers must lower interest rates again. This cycle is going on 
again and again, making output more volatile. He argues that the reduced impact of oil and 
commodity shocks after 1980s is due to the stable and low inflation expectation resulted from a 
successful policy after Volker took office as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.  
However, the question itself is not easy to be completely settled. The fundamental problem 
is the endogeneity problem. The fundamental shocks would be reduced along with a good policy 
implemented by central banks, and good structural changes may happen as well. Conversely, if 
the economy has a good luck or good structural change, the central banks will have more potential 
policy tools to achieve the dual mandate. The worse the economic situations (bad luck or bad 
structural changes), in a higher probability the policy would be a bad policy due to a more limited 
number of feasible policy tools. So, the fundamental question is: where is the “starting point”?  
We put forth a potential mechanism that can exogenously generate excessive 
macroeconomic volatility under unobservability. There are two layers of “amplifiers” for 
macroeconomic fluctuations: endogenous expectation switching and policy strategy switching. 
The mechanism is as follows. Unobservability makes agents endogenously choose best-performed 
models to form expectations leading to the first level of excessive volatility amplified by 
endogenous expectation formation. Upon seeing such large volatility, the policy maker must set a 
higher expected inflation threshold to avoid the deflation risk, and such a higher threshold makes 
the policy regime switching more frequently, resulting in an even larger, named as the second level 
of, macroeconomic volatility.  
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Based on our analysis above, a large macroeconomic fluctuation does not necessarily result 
from a bad luck. The endogenous expectation formation gives a first level of amplified volatility. 
The dilemma faced by policy makers indicates that sometimes an excessive macroeconomic 
volatility does not imply that a bad policy is made because monetary policy also takes a 




Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Our paper provides a theoretical explanation for excessive macroeconomic fluctuations with 
unobservability in regime switching where agents consider to endogenously choose a best-
performed model for expectation formation. We discuss three cases: no regime switching, regime 
switching with agents’ ability to observe the dominant regime and regime switching with agents’ 
inability to observe the dominant regime. We find that without the regime switching the agents in 
most cases endogenously use the “correct” forecasting model to form expectation so that the 
macroeconomic volatility cannot be amplified. However, when the regime switching without 
unobservability is introduced, there is a larger economic fluctuation resulting from the regime 
switching. However, agents that can observe the two regimes and the dominant regime will use 
the “right” model to form expectation in most cases, so there is no frequent endogenous expectation 
switching for more fluctuations. When the regime switching with unobservability is considered, 
since agents cannot observe which regime switching is dominant one, agents will shift their 
expectation back and forth based on the two candidate models’ performance, giving rise to a large 
increase in the macroeconomic volatility. 
Furthermore, we explore the monetary policy implications under unobservability. We 
consider the zero lower bound constraint and then the problem of deflation risk. Since it is 
indicated in the third chapter that the unobservability of regime switching can generate the larger 
endogenous volatility in the macroeconomy, the policy maker must consider a policy-related 
solution for those fluctuations. Our recommended policy solution is setting an aggregate expected 
inflation based alert threshold, and the standard Taylor-rule based monetary policy is adopted if 
the aggregate expected inflation is above the threshold; otherwise, an aggressive low policy rate is 
used. We have four findings. First, the output fluctuation pattern is consistent with policy switching, 
but inflation is not. Second, the switching of agents’ expectation always goes along with the policy 
regime. Third, infrequent regime switching does lead to less policy regime switching and then 
lower volatility of output and inflation. fourth, raising the threshold generates stronger fluctuations 
in both output and inflation, and output peaks last longer than the case where the threshold is lower.  
Moreover, we discuss two interesting issues. First, with unobservability, policy makers 
face a dilemma: maintain macroeconomic stability and avoid inflation risk. It is worth pointing out 
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that such dilemma does not necessarily exist without unobservability. Regime switching will lead 
agents to change their expectation frequently and generate more volatility and policy makers must 
raise the threshold to avoid the deflationary spiral and the economy is more frequently switched 
between the normal policy regime and the aggressive policy regime, giving rise to a strong 
macroeconomic instability. So, if policy makers do not raise the threshold, the economy would be 
exposed under a higher deflation risk. Second, large macroeconomic fluctuations are not 
necessarily from bad luck or bad policy. We argue that unobservability can generate endogenous 
volatility which is not from bad luck, and policy makers raising the threshold to avoid the 
deflationary spiral but make the economy more frequently switched between the normal policy 






A. Benchmark Parameter Calibration: Galí (2015) 
Parameters Description Calibrated Value 
𝜶𝟏 Backward-looking coefficient in IS curve 0 
𝜶𝟐 Forward-looking coefficient in IS curve 1 
𝜶𝟑 Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1 
𝝀𝟏 Backward-looking coefficient in Phillips curve 0 
𝝀𝟐 Discount factor  0.99 
𝝀𝟑 Slope of the NKPC (composite parameter for price rigidity) 0.0572 
𝝆𝒆 Persistence parameter in demand shock 0.8 
𝝆𝒖 Persistence parameter in supply shock 0.8 
𝛔𝒆 Standard deviation in demand shock 0.0001 
𝛔𝒖 Standard deviation in demand shock 0.0001 
𝝌𝒙 Central bank’s output gap response 1.5 
𝝌𝝅 Central bank’s output gap response 1.5 
 
B. Derivation for Coefficients’ Update 
According to PLM 1 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡−1𝑠𝑡 + 𝑣𝑡 , where 𝑣𝑡 is iid with mean 0. When new time-t data comes 
into agents’ information set, 𝐵𝑡 will be updated. Using the moment method, we have  
𝐸𝑦𝑡𝑠𝑡′ = 𝐵𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡′ 
Where 𝐸𝑦𝑡𝑠𝑡






′ = 𝐵𝑡𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡′ , 
then we have  
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜉1𝑡𝐸𝑦𝑡−1𝑠𝑡
′(𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑡′)






































Applying the similar method, we can obtain 𝐵𝑡













0′)−1 and 𝐶𝑡 = 𝜉1𝑡 + 𝜉2𝑡𝑟𝑠𝑦𝑡 +
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